Interesting article ref MG42/Late War Germans (longish)

general discussion points related to gaming, painting and modelling in this period
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Interesting article ref MG42/Late War Germans (longish)

Post by Sgt Steiner » Mon Jun 06, 2005 10:44 am

Hi

Found this gem related on Rapid Fire forum (they are discussing merits of +1 factor for German squads firing in RF2). Very interesting reading (at least for WWII buffs) and from an esteemed source (Sydney Jary is old soldier and author of 18 Platoon one of the premier first-hand accounts of Brit officer)

Note I have no idea what "Carbuncle for f 'The Wrap?'" means either :lol:


Enjoy :D
..........................................................................................................

A Matter of Vulnerabilities: German Infantry Weaknesses in WWII

Sydney Jary MC

In the course of working up material with Carbuncle for f 'The Wrap?'
(p 30), we identified some matters which did not fit with the main
thrust of that article but which we felt deserved an airing, as they
have a relevance going beyond their immediate context. They represent
realities from WWII experience which are very much in tune with the
manoeuvrist approach.

Key Dependencies

Many years ago, when I was writing 18 Platoon, I said that: 'in many
attacks the prisoners we took outnumbered our attacking force and
German units who would continue to resist at close quarters were few
indeed'. Stupidly I did not expand on this statement. Recently, while
dozing after Sunday lunch, my mind wandered around the extraordinary
change in the fighting performance of most of the German infantry
that occurred during the closing stages of a battle. German platoons,
companies and battalions which, early in the battle, had fought with
heartless ferocity, would surrender in aimless droves. This
phenomenon happened frequently. Why was this?

After pondering on this matter a factor, common to my experience in
many battles, emerged. The German infantry lost heart once we had
knocked out their MG42 detachments. There was undoubtedly an over
reliance on their MGs both in the attack and, more obviously, in
defence. I suspect that this was the consequence of the training they
received which certainly dated back to the Somme in 1916 and probably
before - certainly it was noted on many occasions in the 1918 battles
that ordinary German infantry did not seem to know how to use their
rifles. In 1944-45 their riflemen, not including their snipers, were
generally poor shots. They seemed to be primarily carriers of cases
and more cases of linked ammunition for their MGs.

Eliminating the MG42 was our first priority and, due to the gun's
high rate of firepower - has it ever been exceeded? - and well sited
mutually supporting positions, it could rarely be achieved by
physical assault, even using fire and movement. To knock them out we
required HE, fired directly by supporting armour or, indirectly by
Dennis Clarke or Bramley Hancock, our beloved F00s. It took me until
our assault on Mont Pincon on 6th August to realise what game the
Germans were playing. Clearly they did not like close combat and
chose to keep us at arm's length with a display of massive MG
firepower. Without HE support it was almost always impossible to get
close enough to assault with rifle and bayonet. Our infantry platoons
could not match the firepower of the MG42. This was recognised to
some extent in the training pamphlets of the time; The Infantry
Company 1942 states that two British platoons were required to win a
firefight against one German - and this was before the MG42 was on
general issue. Of one thing I am certain, a platoon armed with SA8O
and LSW would be stopped by MG42s well out of range of their own
platoon weapons.

But remember, there was always the perennial problem of locating well
camouflaged MG's. The Germans were very good indeed at concealment
and their tracer rounds, igniting two hundred yards from the muzzle
of the gun, assisted this. For instance, during the early stages of
our assault on Mont Pincon we were engaged by about a dozen MG 42s:
to this day I have no idea of their position. German reliance on the
MG was by no means restricted to defence. In the attack they rarely
finished with an assault with rifle and bayonet preferring to deluge
the opposition with a powerful display of MG firepower supplemented
by machine pistols and stick grenades.

A Matter of Balance

I tend to view past battles fought by my platoon as an artist would
judge his paintings or a composer his compositions. My favourites
are, first, the infiltration through the back lanes of Vernonnet
during Operation NEPTUNE, 43rd (Wessex) Division's assault crossing
of the Seine at Vernon in late August 1944. The next is an advance to
contact - and in contact too - from Cleve to Bedburg on 12 February
1945 in Operation VERITABLE.

They had much in common: both were essentially light infantry fast
infiltration operations. Both were unsupported by artillery or
armour. And, both were highly successful. The third, Mont Pincon, was
different in that we had effective artillery support and a spirited
modicum of armour. All three had a very important tactic in common,
which was infiltration leading to surprise, and catching the
opposition off-balance. In my view, the Germans did not generally
expect to be surprised by British tactics and as a result were that
much more vulnerable when it did happen.

'If at first you don't succeed, try something sneaky' is a maxim that
should appeal to a Light Infantry Platoon Commander. It always
requires brains, more often than not considerable sweat, but it does
save blood.

In recent years I have had a great deal of experience with today's
Army, particularly the Infantry and I find as little interest shown
in infiltration as there was in my time. My 18 Platoon became masters
of the tactic. In Vernonnet my Company penetrated to the escarpment
behind the town, outflanked the opposition and took all the
battalion's objectives. At Bedburg the platoon, as point platoon of
129 Brigade, advanced four miles, overran a company of
Fallschirmjager, killing thirteen and taking fifty seven prisoners.
We were twenty-two strong. This enabled the battalion to take ground
which allowed 43rd (Wessex) Division to wheel behind the Reichswald
Forest towards Goch.

At Mont PinCon on 6th August 1944, having been brought to a grinding
halt by overwhelming fire from MG42s, after dark the whole battalion
infiltrated through the German positions, thus becoming king of the
castle.

Admittedly infiltration is not for beginners, but it sits comfortably
within the concept of mission command - which itself is not for
beginners. It does seem to this old soldier that skill at
infiltration should be second nature to our light unarmoured infantry
battalions. In the kind of peace support operations now so
fashionable, it may well provide decisive results at low cost in
numbers required and, so importantly, in casualties too.>>
"Merry it was to laugh there-where death becomes absurd and life absurder. For power was on us as we slashed bones -. Not to feel sickness or remorse of murder." Wilfred Owen
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Post by barr7430 » Mon Jun 06, 2005 2:07 pm

You're right Gary, this is a very good article. Particularly relevant I think to FoW, more so than RF2 which is company/battalion based. I have read many other pieces which suggest that the Germans were not comfortable with close/melee combat, preferring to put up a wall of fire. I do however find these accounts somewhat at odds with the army which fought so hard in cauldrons like Stalingrad. How much of battle performance is collective mentality and how much is contextual/circumstantial??

I don't know the answer but I wonder if anyone does?

cheers and thanks


Barry
"If you think you can, or if you think you can't, you are probably right"

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Post by Sgt Steiner » Mon Jun 06, 2005 3:54 pm

Hi Barry
I have read many other pieces which suggest that the Germans were not comfortable with close/melee combat,
Yup Cpl Jones was right "they dont like it up em !' :lol:
I do however find these accounts somewhat at odds with the army which fought so hard in cauldrons like Stalingrad.
The Whermacht units of 1944 a pale shadow of their 1942 counterparts mayhap ?
Mr Jary does not indicate in article if this applied to all German units encountered in particular did he encounter SS ? he does mention Fallschirmjager but again only in 1945 presumably at the end of their tether.
Several accounts initimate that SS (at least 'best' units) were more likely to 'go toe to toe' (in particular the 12th SS youths) but I do feel that Jary is spot on for the bulk of 'ordinary' German units late war generalisation not withstanding as several others (mainly Brits I must say) make mention of the Germans being super tough then overly fragile as units.
In the way that US troops are sometimes termed 'Coca-Cola' soldiers (ie too dependant on home comforts) maybe we could think of 'average' German units as 'MG42' soldiers. Certainly their offical squad doctrine was based around the MG34/42s.

I think this really an issue for Skirmish type games wherein an indivdual MG team can be targetted and its loss therefore simulated as a big morale hit. In FOW and similar counts MG42s as inherent to the late war German Inf bases (ie they fire as MGs not Rifle or Rif/MG). A special rule is possible I suppose but FOW in particular has way too many of those already IMHO in the army lists.
How much of battle performance is collective mentality and how much is contextual/circumstantial??
Big question and I suspect it varies from unit to unit, nationality, environment etc etc
So much simpler to let dice make this 'decision' in a wargame :D

Cheers
"Merry it was to laugh there-where death becomes absurd and life absurder. For power was on us as we slashed bones -. Not to feel sickness or remorse of murder." Wilfred Owen
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Post by barr7430 » Fri Jan 06, 2006 6:52 pm

I've kept this one on the back burner for some time, occasionally coming back to the idea and mulling over how to create a scenario from it. Fairly extensive experience of FoW games now has given me the comfort that I could set up a company level mission for the Yanks/Brits to take out MG42 positions with limited (ie say only two or three rounds of) artillery support - thus having to time their assault to perfection. The German morale would drop from Confident Vet to Reluctant Vet immediately on elimination of the MG42s.

Will write it now and get it played sometime in the near future. Thanks again Gary for a very interesting little gem :wink:

B
"If you think you can, or if you think you can't, you are probably right"

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Post by Sgt Steiner » Fri Jan 06, 2006 11:27 pm

Always glad to be of service :D
"Merry it was to laugh there-where death becomes absurd and life absurder. For power was on us as we slashed bones -. Not to feel sickness or remorse of murder." Wilfred Owen
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